Paying the Criminal - The Failure of Green Finance
Paying the Criminal - The Failure of Green FinanceWhy green finance and natural capital markets will not save nature, and why land economists can…
At a Global Biodiversity Alliance meeting in Guyana, a speaker from a development finance institution said we should talk less about the value of biodiversity and more about its price. Robert Nasi, who directs CIFOR-ICRAF, took the remark seriously. In a piece published on 13 November, he explored it against the outcomes of COP17 in Yerevan. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/trouble-price-biodiversity-robert-nasi-uaqoc/ It is a better article than most of what the sector produces. Nasi sees that prices already govern nature and mostly reward its destruction. He sees that carbon credits overstate what they deliver. He ends by saying that governments must decide which losses are unacceptable before anyone builds a natural capital market. Then he stops, a few inches from the answer. This is so infuriating and why I made this essay. If Nasi just continues his argument to say that, instead of funding markets, governments just charge a fee on nature’s destruction, he would have come to the magic answer. And what is more, in charging that fee, reduced the taxes by the same amount on labour, trade and investment, he would have defined the perfect green economy. But he did not, and it is the reason that the natural capital market industry and the mainstream NGOs ignore this fact, which tells me the movement is fundamentally corrupt and will do nothing to reverse the destruction of nature and our environment.
The numbers are frighteningUNEP counts US$7.3 trillion a year of finance that harms nature: US$2.4 trillion of public subsidy and US$4.9 trillion of private money. Nature-based solutions receive US$220 billion, of which private investors supply US$23.4 billion. That is US$30 spent on destruction for every US$1 spent on protection. Governments promised, under Target 18 of the Kunming-Montreal framework, to cut harmful incentives by at least US$500 billion a year by 2030. By July, 84% of countries had missed the deadline even to identify them. In Yerevan, a paragraph urging stronger action was watered down to a gentle encouragement. Saudi Arabia and Russia were among those who opposed it, and India proposed deleting it near the end. In the same fortnight, the EU, France and Peru launched the Friends of Credits for Nature and Biodiversity, presented by a European Commissioner, with a dozen more governments joining or being welcomed. A separate Friends of Target 18 was set up to work on the subsidies. So one club tends a market the World Economic Forum put at about US$8 million in 2023. The other is supposed to be a US$2.4 trillion subsidy. The institutions are lavishing attention on the small market that pays people to protect nature, while the large machine that pays people to destroy it carries on. Nobody asked the obvious question. Why is destroying nature so profitable? Where does the profit come from?Ricardo explained it two centuries ago. Rent is the surplus a piece of land or a natural resource earns over the worst land in use. Henry George pushed the argument further in 1879. That surplus is not the product of the owner’s labour. It is created by everyone else: by the roads and drains the public paid for, by growing demand, by the plain fact that nobody can make more land. The owner collects it for holding the title. When a title carries a right to clear the forest, drain the fen, plough the hillside or drill the field, the owner will chase the rent attached to that right. The profit from conversion is the capitalised rent of the converted land, and the externalities (carbon, silt, floods, lost species) are dumped on everyone else. The owner keeps the first and the public pays the second. That is the colossal profit nobody names. Subsidy works the same way. A payment tied to land does not stay with the farmer. It is capitalised into the price of the land, so the extra income goes to whoever held the title on the day the payment was announced, and the next buyer pays it away in a higher price. The IMF put total fossil fuel subsidies at US$7 trillion in 2022, or 7.1% of world GDP, with 82% of that being undercharging for environmental damage. Nasi’s own US$2.4 trillion of harmful public subsidy is a rent stream, and it is being held by identifiable people. Green money gets captured in the same way. Savills, which advises the people buying land, says that net zero and biodiversity targets will move land into renewables, tree planting and rewilding and will keep supply short enough to strengthen farmland values. Read that again. The estate agent has looked at the nature strategy and found a land price forecast. The Telegraph reported on planned inheritance tax changes that would give relief to landowners who convert farmland to woodland or wild land, with some of Britain’s wealthiest landowners among those in line to benefit. Pay owners to leave land alone, and you raise the price of land. A higher price means the next owner needs more income from it, which means more pressure to extract or more payment to refrain. It is a treadmill whose only guaranteed winner is the title holder. So when Nasi suggests that credits could pay for the outcomes governments define, we should be plain about the structure. It means paying the holder of a monopoly to refrain from the harm that monopoly makes profitable. It has the shape of a protection racket, with better branding. What the reference list tells youNasi cites twenty-three sources. They fall into two kinds. One kind counts the damage: UNEP, IPBES, Costanza, Dasgupta. The other measures the failure of the market response: Probst, West, Swinfield, zu Ermgassen, Gordon. It is a careful and honest bibliography of a problem and of a response to it that has not worked. Look at what is absent. Not one title concerns land rent, land values, or who ends up holding a subsidy once it has been capitalised. There is no fiscal analysis of any kind, and no mention of the IMF’s finding that fully reforming fossil fuel prices would raise about US$4.4 trillion and could pay to cut taxes on labour. The sector has produced decades of work on valuing nature and almost none on who pockets the economic rent when nature is destroyed. Notice also the market projections. The WEF figure of US$2 billion in 2030 and US$69 billion by 2050 depends, as Nasi notes, on effective progress on governance. Meanwhile, Pollination, which advises clients in this market, estimates that no more than US$1.85 million of biodiversity credits have been sold, mostly at or below US$25 each. The projection is a sales brochure. The measured market is a rounding error. As I am in the Biodiversity Credit market, I can tell you the market is crashing, and its promises are evaporating as I write. The winners are the countless army of start-up brokers and financiers and the virtue-signalling LinkedIn Warriors proclaiming its revolutionary nature. The market responseCarbon is the best test, as Nasi says, because a tonne of CO2 is a standard unit. The results are poor. Probst and colleagues assessed 2,346 crediting projects and found that less than 16% of credits issued represented real emission reductions, and 25% for avoided deforestation. West and colleagues looked at 18 voluntary REDD+ projects with enough public data and estimated that about 94% of the credits did not reflect real reductions. Swinfield and colleagues, synthesising six evaluations of 44 projects, found almost eleven times more credits issued than justified. To be fair to the sector, they also found that four in five projects did protect forest. Even so, the best case is a payment of ten dollars for a dollar’s worth of something that might have happened anyway. Then there is Kariba. The Zimbabwean project, sold to household-name brands, became a case study after a Guardian, Die Zeit and SourceMaterial investigation in January 2023 alleged that the great majority of Verra’s rainforest credits were likely worthless. Verra disputed that. But in October 2025, Verra concluded its own investigation of Kariba and found that the project’s credits had been overstated by 15,220,520 credits. The project owner, Carbon Green Investments, disputes this and has demanded Verra’s data. REDD-Monitor, relaying the Guardian’s reporting, noted that only a fraction of more than €100 million raised had reached villages in the project area. Bloomberg reported that the developer’s share of proceeds was higher than the 25% it had stated. South Pole, the developer, rejected claims of over-crediting. Its chief executive resigned in November 2023, and Verra’s chief executive had resigned a few months after the Guardian story. The point does not depend on who wins that dispute. The structure is the problem. Under Verra’s system, the organisations that run the projects produce their own forecasts of how much deforestation they will stop, using Verra’s rules. Verra, a non-profit, receives a fee for each transaction. The auditors are typically hired by those they audit. Everyone in the chain is paid when a credit is issued. A fundamental conflict of interest and a system almost designed to fail in its own corruption and perverse incentives. England then adopted the same logic by statute. Biodiversity net gain became mandatory for most developments in February 2024. A year in, Wildlife and Countryside Link, using freedom of information requests to 317 local authorities and the offsite register, found 680 hectares secured for offsite habitat creation and a further 93 hectares onsite. That is less than half the minimum habitat the policy was expected to deliver in a year. The Royal Society warned in September 2025 that the way habitats are valued and monitored risks delivering habitats smaller, less diverse and in worse condition than those lost. The National Audit Office found that Defra launched the scheme without all the elements in place for long-term success. A June 2026 study found that natural variation in ecologists’ judgement of habitat conditions can swing how many units a developer must deliver or buy. And on 31 July, the Regulatory Policy Committee published its opinion on a proposal to exempt development sites below 0.2 hectares altogether. Wild Justice’s report warned that unless the underlying factors change, the net gain will exist only on spreadsheets. Nasi cites the older evidence. A global review found only about a third of no net loss policies and individual offsets reported meeting their goal. Gordon and colleagues described four perverse incentives that arise even in well-designed offset schemes. Everything England has done since fits those warnings. Look at who gets paid in net gain. The developer pays, and the landowner who sells habitat units collects. It is another rent stream, handed to whoever owns the right sort of field in the right sort of place. The land beneath the housing estate still carries its uplift, and the public gets a spreadsheet. The rent stream takes the lion’s share of the income before anyone else is paid, and it removes the economic force that could restore nature. It is a sleight of hand. We settle the land rent first and only then ask what is left for wildlife, which is never enough. The same trick runs through the whole economy. It is why we have poverty and why oligarchs itch for war. The value a community creates together, through its numbers, its roads, its schools and its demand for land, is seized by private title holders before a child is fed or taught, before a single job is created and before a single species is saved. It is a colossal con on the people of the world. They produce the wealth, and they are then charged for the privilege of living on the ground that gave rise to it.
WHY?Now, to motive, most people in nature finance sincerely want nature to recover. I am not alleging that all individuals are frauds, although many exist. I am describing a revenue model. Follow the money through a credit scheme. The developer takes a cut. The verifier is paid by the developer. The certifier earns per transaction. The broker takes a margin. The consultancy writes the guidance and the conference sells the tickets. The standards body is funded by the market it standardises. Each of them gets paid when a credit is issued, a framework is published, or a coalition is launched. That is a lot of work, well remunerated, and the one reform that would actually work, putting a direct tax on nature’s destruction, would put most of them out of business. If the profit were taken out of destroying nature, there would be no need for a market to bribe people not to do it, no need for a verification industry to check whether the bribe worked, or, more likely, disguise the fact, and no need for a thousand working groups on the metric. A profession cannot be expected to campaign for its own redundancy. It campaigns for more finance, more credits, more standards, more “unlocking”. It was ever thus. The poverty industry never abolished poverty either. So the sector has acquired a class of people whose product is an announcement: the launch, the pledge, the taxonomy, the “Friends of” group, the long post about a new partnership. Their feeds fill with progress. The drains stay open and the ploughs stay in the field. England’s flagship law has secured a tiny 680 hectares offsite in its first year, and the conference circuit has not slowed down. Any NGO that takes corporate money, or holds a stake in a market it endorses, owes the public a prominent declaration of that interest. Ask for one. Where the answer is vague, or where an organisation lobbies for credits and offsets while staying quiet on rent and subsidy, you have learnt something. The people most badly served are the sincere ones who give their money and their weekends to protect nature and are fooled into enthusiastic support of a fundamentally corrupt process that will never work at scale.
What would workDo the opposite of what the sector is doing. Charge the holder the full rent of land and natural resources, collect for externalities at source, and use the revenue to abolish taxes on wages, buildings, investment and trade. The IMF has already shown that reforming fossil fuel pricing could raise US$4.4 trillion and pay for cuts in labour taxes. The principle extends to every form of rent: ground rent, minerals, water, timber, the electromagnetic spectrum, the right to pollute. Three things follow. First, the profit goes out of destruction. If the monopoly and externality economic rents of a cleared forest or a drained fen are collected by the public each year, there is nothing left for those who profit from such an activity. The expected uplift stops being capitalised into the price of the land, so speculation stops. The subsidy trap closes too, because a payment that is taxed back as rent cannot inflate the price of the land. Second, land comes into the hands of those who use it. Land held idle in expectation of a rising price costs its owner a tax bill every year. The best land is used harder. The worst land, which earns little rent and carries little tax, no longer has a subsidy or a tax shelter propping up its price, and it drops below the margin of production and is left to rewild. Nature takes it back for free. Natural regeneration rebuilds soil carbon at no cost to the public, which is more than can be said for a credit scheme that spends money on auditors. This is passive rewilding, and it is the cheapest conservation there is, and the best. Third, poverty falls and the pressure falls on nature with it. Taxes on work and trade reduce output and hold wages down, while rent soaks up the surplus. Take the taxes off and wages rise, easing some of the pressure on forest margins for people with no alternative income. Resource rents held privately are also what warlords and kleptocrats fight over. Collect them publicly, and you remove the prize. There are fair objections.
A land value tax also does not replace protected areas or regulation. A reserve is still a reserve. Look at all the countries that have had some form of land value capture and see they have some of the best nature; there is a correlation that is hard to deny. Back to the speaker in GuyanaThe speaker said we should focus on price. Nasi answers that a market price cannot see thresholds, cannot capture most of what matters, and cannot decide which losses society will accept. He is right. He then says the decision is political, and that governments should make it before scaling up the market. There is a way to make that decision without inventing a price for a hectare of fen. Collect the rent. Tax the externality. Take the taxes off the people who work, investment and trade. Then let the market, a fine instrument when pointed at honest costs, do what it is good at: finding the least damaging way to meet human needs. Nature does not need a price. 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